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Abstract 
 
This exploratory essay aims to open différance to a form of enquiry it has not seen coming. A 
consideration of the complex temporality that attends its historical emergence leads to a 
specifically différantial articulation of spatio-temporality. A residual element of spacing 
before/behind spatiotemporality provokes further consideration. The notion of verbality is 
introduced to provide analytical purchase. Analysis identifies a fundamental mannerism in 
différance; a participative and orchestrative spacance. Différance participates too 
determinately in this spacing, as this spacing. The paper thus urges différance to rewrite this 
element quasimetaphorically. In the ensuing drama, différance can rewrite the metaphor of 
spacing only by relying again on the spacing of metaphor. Unable to rewrite itself quickly 
enough, nonetheless compelled, an unexpected dimension opens. 
 
 
(In)deference. 
 
If one can forgive the conceit of a paper that presumes to begin with time,i specifically with 
what time is or was before or after Derrida, then I will take as an initial coordinate that point 
in time, somewhere between late Heidegger and early Derrida, where the notion of différance 
first emerges. Of course this point, this time, these proper names, arriving late and clumsy, we 
use only as crude approximations; heuristic devices that allow us to continue to write amidst 
the painful complexity of it all. We are now mostly well-versed in all of this, rhetoric or 
otherwise. Largely adept, if never entirely rigorous, in interpreting the flood of points, names, 
notions, words, as mere secondary effects. Effects, that is to say, of that which emerges from 
them in supplementary fashion. Just as différance emerged, so late in Western thought; the 
reclusive writer stepping reticently from the wings. All that remains for us, the doubly late 
children of a lesser age, is to simply deal with this emergence. To get on with it or over it, 
trying somehow to live up to these texts that have provoked us. 
 
But what writing! What could possibly pass for a fitting response in the face of this call? How 
can one hope to meet with the summons issued, albeit inadvertently, by the very stature of the 
work that precedes us? If intentions any longer mattered ours would have been entirely good. 
Systemically unsure of ourselves, unconvinced by the various emergent directions suggested 
for ‘post-continental’ thought, one should not confuse hesitancy for nonchalance. We have 
barely begun to understand what just happened, but already we are being asked to move 
along; barely have we begun to read these texts and already it is suggested that the time has 
come to write about other matters – as though we still knew how. All our words come too 
quickly; being spent so easily. Breaking tiredly against the flanks of an aposiopesis that 
implacably demands more, we are persuaded we should never have begun, and thereby fated 
to continue. One can go no further and do no other than press-on. There is no effort that will 
not entangle us more, no penance that will expiate nor respite to be won in quietism and 
restraint, and even in saying this little we have said too much, though none of it new. Such is 
our luck: a hollow calling; an impotent and unremarkable responsibility. Still one persists. As 
though this logorrhoealism were itself meaningful, as though notwithstanding everything we 
have been taught, yet meaning will out; and that this meaning and this ‘as though’ are not also 
only meaning. It is already too late again; too late for our stumbling prose to recover itself. 
And so under the impassive weight of this heavy sky we struggle to write without affect or 
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polemic, fearing that few words are left to us. 
 
 
A Beginning 
 
Of course différance did not really emerge, not as such. It was already there, more or less, in 
Plato and only ever there more or less in Derrida, as his series of prolific iterations are 
intended to demonstrate. One might even go so far as to suggest that Derrida’s unwavering 
pursuit (so determinedly playful) across all manner of intellectual and cultural terrain, served 
only to betray différance. Argue, if only for strategic reasons, that Plato, harboring différance 
unthought in his work, was a better Derrida than Derrida. Betraying différance by portraying 
différance (to employ for a moment the Levinasian motif), was Derrida’s work perhaps less 
responsible, less true to différance than Plato’s? But maybe in this strange philosophical 
environ that’s more or less proper, or is that improper? And so on… 
 
None of this will surprise you. Comfortable with the economic logicii of the ‘more-or-less’ 
that rigorously orchestrates this pas de deux, we now urbanely traverse the hyphenic between 
arising amidst Heidegger-Derrida—somewhere between Seyn with a ‘y’ and différance with 
an ‘a’. This logic would give us to understand the nonappearance of différance in Plato as 
being orchestrated by the trace of its appearance in Derrida. Plato, that is to say, was only able 
to write by not writing. On the other hand (for as we well know différance is always at a 
minimum ambidextrous) its appearance in Derrida is only the trace of its nonappearance 
elsewhere, which is perhaps why early Derrida could only have proceeded by systematically 
rewriting the works of Western philosophy. Truthfully, then, neither Plato nor Derrida are the 
better Derrida because there is no Derrida, only Plato-Derrida. How, then, are we to interpret 
this hyphen between Plato and Derrida, which like that troublesome ‘a’ will not have been 
heard throughout the course of this epoch? Obviously it cannot be the hyphen of a simple 
temporal transition, from Plato to Derrida; philosophical poles along the course of a linear 
history of ideas. And yet différance still emerges, at a certain point in time, from a certain 
place, relative to Plato – a time/place called Derrida. We cannot represent this emergence 
teleologically or consequentially; différance cannot be called to account by time, but rather 
accounts for time (as we will shortly reemphasize). This hyphenic between, then, is not 
governed by temporal progression. Whatever divides and unites Plato and Derrida in our 
example, whatever spaces them, it is not first and foremost time. These effects of time, just 
like those of the name, ought not to mislead us. The form of the between instituted by the 
trace “would not be the mixture, the transition between form and the amorphous, presence 
and absence, [Plato and Derrida] etc, but that which, by eluding this opposition, makes it 
possible in the irreducibility of its excess.” (Derrida, 1982:172 n16. My addition). More 
precisely, then, there is nothing plenitudinous that unites the more-or-less of the appearance-
nonappearance of différance, but an excess that orchestrates this economy, and which is once 
again and ‘more originally’ différance. Or, more properly, différance in différance.  
 
This hyphenic space, devoid of time, God, Being or desire, lacking purchase, form or 
foothold, will not yield to philosophy. A meta-aposiopesis; a silencing evocation that leaves 
us lost for words though mouths still moving; a ‘Just because!’ that blankly curtails our every 
Why? Having so brilliantly, so busily, and yet so self-effacingly orchestrated all things (now 
and then and here and there and all points in between) différance has certainly secured for us 
space to read and write. Is there, though, no longer a question one could put to différance that 
is not already formulated from within its own sphere of orchestration – a question that would 
unsettle rather than reiterate? For whatever we say we seem to say only différance, whether 
indeed we speak or not. With every word, no more nor less, with every offbeat, gap or pause, 
there différance resonates. Could one presume to bring this obdurate aposiopesis to the brink 
of a question it has not already imagined? 
 
As a preliminary gesture, intended to help articulate the course and character of a certain 
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philosophical ‘project,’ I have grown accustomed to juxtaposing two passages: the first of 
these from Heidegger’s Basic Problems of Phenomenology, where he in turn quotes Aristotle:  
 
That which has been sought for from of old and now and in the future and 
constantly, and that on which inquiry founders over and over again, is the 
problem What is being?   
(Aristotle-Heidegger, 1982:15) 
The second from Of Grammatology: 
 
One must therefore go by way of the question of being as it is directed by 
Heidegger and by him alone, at and beyond onto-theology, in order to reach 
the rigorous thought of that strange nondifference and in order to determine 
it correctly.   
(Derrida, 1976:23) 
 
By way of the question of being. Différance emerges in this way, as this way and as the 
wayness of this way (meta-odos). As way and wayness, the emergence of différance, I 
suggest, marks the end of a distinctive questioning comportment, the particularity of which 
has yet to be foregrounded. Given what has been already said around the subject of time, it is 
important to clarify the status of this ‘emergence’ more precisely. For the question of being to 
which Aristotle-Heidegger refers—an inquiry that points toward the constitution of time even 
in the context of this simple repeated quotation (fug-unfug)—is less a question configured in 
time than it is, de jure, configuring of time. With its historical emergence, that is to say, 
différance repatterns time, realising time in a distribution of time that inaugurates the motif of 
the re-. Clearly, though, one cannot understand this repatterning as part of an unproblematic 
‘history of ideas,’ without simply assuming those very ‘metaphysical’ formations Heidegger-
Derrida calls into question. Thus, the historical repatterning that takes place somewhere in the 
midst of 20th Century continental philosophy, is also a repatterning of history that gives place; 
a transcendental re- realized via the supplement of an empirical re- which continually thwarts 
the ambitions of this, now quasi, transcendental. Accordingly, one cannot simply imagine that 
différance emerges in time; just in time for Heidegger-Derrida. Earliest of all, différance was 
never timely but remains ever late for itself. On the other hand, while no mere historical 
object, différance undoubtedly emerges in some measure as a response to the demands of this 
particular question, an answer (of sorts). One must of course be careful not to collapse back 
into crude, linear explanations here, temporal or otherwise, but equally neither can différance 
disown the traces that constitute its heritage. A more responsible prose would therefore 
attempt to respect the logic in play with this question-answer we call différance: neither 
strictly configured in time, nor configuring of time, neither passive nor active but middling in 
between, one might best regard the question of essence-difference as a question configured 
over time. Read this way and that, the ambivalence of this formulation gives to us a question-
answer born in time, borne by time, born out of time and before time – configured and 
configuring, more-or-less. With formulations of this type contemporary thought is able to 
bear witness to the characteristic complexity of essence-difference across its various fields of 
possible enquiry.iii   
 
Clearly it would be no simple matter to extract from this questioning comportment its 
essential features, each interface with différance merely leaving a ‘skim’ of logic; the 
perception of a surface glinting in the perpetual withdrawal of différance itself. Neither 
critique nor deconstruction will prove equal to the demands of such an analysis therefore. 
This impasse (we do not say aporia) will require judicious negotiation of now familiar paths 
and, if différance is to surpass itself, will testify to the continuing glimmer of a certain non-
différantial waywardness. For if différance were indeed the outworking of a particular 
questioning comportment, then one immediately raises the possibility of other comportments, 
other logics and other outworkings that can no longer be considered merely different 
comportments, logics or outworkings: modalities of difference rather than modalities in 
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différance. Rather than being the only question, is the enquiring comportment we know as 
ontology only a particular question? Being the question it is, being set in its ways, has it 
merely unfolded time and space in a predeterminedly characteristic manner? Undoubtedly 
this questioning comportment (ti esti, What is?) has exerted enormous influence, for so long 
orchestrating thought (not only as first philosophy, but in politics, ethics, and aesthetics 
alike). Might there be ways of thinking the political, though, that are not first onto-political?iv 
Might ethics or art be thought along a course irreducible to an ontological or quasi-
ontological mode of enquiry? A preparatory essay is not the place to engage in this level of 
detail. Nonetheless, my contention is that one might indeed preserve other regions of thought 
from immediate reduction to ontology, or indeed epistemology; that there are modalities of 
difference other than the play of essence-difference, and these axiomatically demarcate their 
own regions of thought. 
 
The course of the question of essence concludes (perhaps unsurprisingly) with essence 
questioning ‘itself’ ‘as such’ – questioning the essence of essence. Thus distending the 
question in portentous ways essence itself never foresaw, yet this question continues in the 
way of its unfolding, albeit now under the auspices of différer rather than Sein. Although (late 
as we are) we failed to realize it for some considerable time, essence only ever was 
différance, just as différance is essence and nothing besides. The hyphenated term ‘essence-
difference’ attempts to designate the domain of this questioning comportment. Elsewhere we 
unpack this formulation a little further and wonder whether there are perhaps comportments 
of another sort, with another history, another start – like a Why? irreducible in its demeanor to 
a ‘What is?’ A question that avoids the calmly measured gait of that form of thinking 
animated by an orchestrative spacing (announcing itself in philosophy’s continuing allegiance 
to categories, dialectics, oppositions and the like). A more desperate, visceral Why? torn from 
Eve’s lips and hurled at the darkening sky.v To be sure, différance edges towards thinking this 
spacing as mere spacing, but in so doing posits spacing as an unsurpassable limit, which 
within the confines of its particular comportment it surely is. If, therefore, we are correct in 
suggesting that différance is pre-structured or even pre-ordained (such a properly improper 
suggestion) by a particular questioning comportment, then to evince this it is necessary to 
demonstrate more adequately and precisely the necessary relationship between différance and 
spacing. The remainder of this essay accordingly attempts to respond, with a writing 
otherwise than différance.  
 
To be clear, we are suggesting that the hyphenic space of the différantial between, devoid of 
plenitude, mere excess, is nonetheless contoured by certain ‘mannerisms’ peculiar to the 
question of essence as received. These bearings thus facilitate the orchestration of essence-
difference in ways peculiar to this one questioning comportment. The essay will later exhort 
us to think further, harder or faster about the trajectories of this différantial between. To 
progress to this moment, however, it is necessary to more adequately provoke the issue of the 
place of différance, or the space of différance. Better yet, how the place of différance as the 
consummative moment of a Western philosophical programme, is assured by the hyphenic, 
nonplenitudinous spacance of différance. An element of spacing différance cannot rewrite 
without also simply writing it again, this motif of spacing figures for us a fundamental 
catachresis (already properly improper) that both allows access to, and, in some sense, 
authorizes the entire quasi-metaphoric system.  
 
Perhaps we are being overly provocative with our choice of words, and no doubt we ought to 
display more rigor in our crossing through (as though rigor could save us). Nonetheless, we 
hope to demonstrate that without this spacing there could be no différance, but that différance 
can never rest with this element of spacing. And perhaps this is what propels différance, 
lending impetus and allowing, despite everything, for the very directionality of time’s 
dimensions; perhaps this is why différance is so edgy, always on the move, always looking 
for something different? Arguing that this catachresis is internally compelled to unfold out of 
itself, unfold other than itself, the paper marks the course of this unfolding as différance 
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struggles to surpass itself. Gerundially pressing into each opening dimension in exponential 
fashion, sliding with différance, our analysis will chase (for we can no longer trace) the 
movement of a failed rewriting in a direction other than that of the relève. 
 
 
Spatio-temporality and quasi-metaphoricity 
 
We begin again, therefore, speaking of time, not directly or literally but textually, in order to 
rehearse in greater detail the important différantial reconfiguration of spatio-temporality. 
Crudely put, one can identify different ways to enquire of essence vis a vis space-time. When 
asked ‘vulgarly,’ for instance, essence works out spatially (in terms of substantiality or 
extension, say), and spatiality subordinates temporality; when asked ‘primordially’ essence 
works out temporally (in terms of Existenz), and temporality subordinates spatiality—as for 
the Heidegger of Being and Time who famously argues that the priority given to “spatial 
representation” in the philosophical history of time, is attributable to the fact that 
“Temporality is essentially falling, and it loses itself in making present” (Heidegger 
1962:421). Later, of course, he corrects himself, admitting that “[s]pace is fundamentally 
different to time. […] There is no reason to trace it back to ‘time,’ because the re-presenting 
of space is a temporalizing. […] only by virtue of this utmost difference do they refer to their 
origin, time-space [Zeit-Raum]” (Heidegger, 1999:263). With this hyphenic play of space and 
time, a proto-différance, we arrive, albeit before time, at a much more Derridean conception 
of spatio-temporality, where again the silent hyphen bears the weight of a trace gesturing 
toward a différantial constitution.vi When asked textually, therefore, essence works out 
(provisionally, before working itself out in essence-difference) in a spatio-temporal manner 
(and here, imperceptible, the emphatic hyphen already foregrounds the différantial between). 
Hyphenic spatio-temporality neither subordinates spatiality to temporality nor visa versa. 
Textually, that is to say, spatiality and temporality are originally complicit, united by their 
differences: the spacing of temporality and the temporalising of spatiality. This reasonably 
well-rehearsed philosophical discussion regarding the nature of space-time, thus brings one to 
the quasi-metaphoric articulation of spatio-temporality.  
 
For is it the case that with this spatio-temporal weave we are promised an understanding of 
what space and time literally are? By no means! That which we have always referred to as 
spatiality or temporality, is itself only a metaphor for the (finitely) infinite differing-deferring, 
without which not. The characteristic mouvance of the re-, if you will, given spatio-temporal 
clothes. Spatio-temporality does not give us this hyphenic différancing in itself. Rather, it is 
as though we merely ‘felt its effect’ in the plenitudinous metaphoric externalization we call 
spatio-temporality - an ‘experience’ (experience as such) that gives itself to us only through 
the remarkable concrescence of difference into effects of essence; simultaneously the 
dissemination of essence in difference. A metaphoric experience, therefore, neither giving 
itself properly, fully, literally, nor as such. As we know, such metaphoricity can no longer be 
conceptualized by a philosophy that has the metaphor unfailingly return to the concept. We 
do not literally ‘feel the effect’ of this differing-deferring as one would feel the warmth of the 
sensory sun; there is no in itself to difference; we effect we feel is only the effect of an effect, 
etc. This ‘in itself’ to which essence-difference turns and returns must, in itself, be understood 
quasi-metaphorically, as if all there were were metaphor. 
 
In this way différance is figured as the (quasi-metaphoric) movement that assembles spatio-
temporality, but which assembles it: i) dissemblingly (assembles it in such a way as to prevent 
there ever being things in themselves called ‘time’ or ‘space’), and; ii) supplementarily (in 
such a way as to disallow the gesture that would return spatio-temporality to différance as its 
proper, literal meaning). The best we can hope for is a metaphoric understanding of this 
differing-deferring where, methodologically, our metaphors return metaphorically, not 
properly; la différance - relève de la métaphore, one might remark. The metaphoric return of 
the relève preventing us from understanding this metaphoricity conceptually, our 
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understanding of the What is…? is reorganized accordingly; that is, quasi-metaphorically. 
Should we find cause to resist the properly heliotropic return of a speculative Aufhebung (or, 
indeed, of a progressively more primordial hermeneutic disclosiveness), we can yet do no 
better than to hope for a metaphorical return, a relève of the heliotrope that gives us space and 
time only on the basis of a catachrestic improperly proper meaning (a metaphoric metaphor), 
and potentially unfolds time and any discourse on time metaphorically without limit. 
 
Two related issues arise, the first concerning a largely untapped quasi-phenomenology of 
time that the différantial élan frees-up in releasing depictions of time from the dominant 
spatio-structural proclivities of an overly formalistic philosophy. Repeating Heidegger’s 
complaint regarding spatial representation in philosophical accounts of time, but without 
accepting that one might yet speak of time directly or authentically, such a différantial 
phenomenology would seek to distend time through a non-spatial quasi-metaphorics; a 
‘poetics of time’ that in fact serves to challenge the traditional association of the question of 
being with interpretations of space-time. The spatial metaphor that philosophy has mined for 
so long in its explication of time would have no greater literal truth than any other metaphor: 
time could just as well grumble as circle, could just as much horror as go-by. Perhaps time 
really could heal, fly, or drowsy, without this being immediately reducible to a spatially-
temporal description of the various passages of time; no longer an articulation of what time 
is, in essence (or, equally, in difference), but a celebration of the multiplicit verbal richness of 
time’s timing. Being’s explication of time, that is to argue, with its distinctive conjugation of 
temporality in the patterning of its verb, was ever and already supplementary—in as much as 
one never simply just ‘was’ or ‘is,’ etc., but only ever ‘was…’ or ‘is….’ To allow this one 
verb (be) a privileged explication of time, therefore, unduly favors the supplement. Although 
one may not wish to go as far as a Nietzschean inversion, which would almost wish to 
expunge this particular verb altogether, still it is possible to enquire of the interpretation of 
time educed by other verbs, as they engage with time in the peculiarity of their specific quasi-
metaphoric ambiances. In this way a non-hierarchical, quasi-phenomenological poetics of 
time would lend itself to an appreciation of time beyond ontology.  
 
In as much as différance provides space for a project of this sort, however, revealing the 
pretensions of presumed authentic singular depictions of time, it also lends space – the 
spacing of metaphoricity. Such a quasi-phenomenology of time, intent on freeing itself from 
spatial representation while still relying on the orchestrative force of différantial metaphorics, 
would thus prove itself ultimately insincere. Owing to its methodological reliance on the 
continued spacing of the quasi-metaphor it would remain only adverbial in nature, modifying 
a master verb (whether Sein or différer seems unimportant) that remains structurally 
uncontaminated notwithstanding its supplementary status. The second issue, therefore, 
concerns not simply the implicit dependence upon spacing that would authorize a 
reinvigorated quasi-phenomenology, but more seriously already points toward the continuing 
role of the spatial metaphor in différance itself. On the face of it something quite rudimentary 
links ontology to spacing. So trivial the observation, one wonders whether any sort of 
thinking would be at all possible without spacing in some form. No doubt, as Heidegger 
indicates, the consideration of time is historically something of a privileged example, but in 
fact the dialectics of points, lines and planes, the horizontal and transverse intentionalities of 
Husserl, the thrown forethrow and horizonal circlings of primordial temporality, testify to a 
methodological necessity that underlies the ontological project more generally. Here, in the 
spacance of quasi-metaphoricity also, we suspect that this necessity continues to work itself 
out. Is it not the case that far from escaping the dominance of the spatial, quasi-metaphoricity 
in fact repeats this dominance (so traditional) in the spacing movement of metaphor. If quasi-
metaphoricity figures the truth of spatio-temporality, and in this manner panics the concept, it 
also firmly repeats the traditional reliance upon the privileged spatial metaphor. 
 
What is the status of this repetition, not straightforwardly a repetition? What is the 
relationship between this repetition and the relève? How are we to understand the spacing 
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movement of metaphor? Without wishing to labor an analysis with which most are familiar, it 
is not just the concept of metaphor as properly understood by philosophy that relies on such 
thematics. Even quasi-metaphoricity, even that differing-deferring, neither active nor passive, 
seemingly rests upon some form of movement tied up in turn with the dominance of a spatial 
articulation. Can quasi-metaphoricity metaphorize this reliance? Can it re-write the element of 
spacing that continues unperturbed through each articulation of différance? Or is it the case 
that quasi-metaphoricity, whilst seeking to disturb the order of the proper, reaffirms that order 
in its insistent reliance upon not just any metaphor but the dominant philosophical metaphor, 
the non-metaphoric ground of metaphor? If one could show the spacing and accordant 
movement of quasi-metaphoricity to be in some sense proper or essential to quasi-
metaphoricity,vii would one have then confirmed such a reliance, no longer a reliance? 
 
To disturb the dominance of this catachrestic metaphor, therefore, how carefully one would 
have to choose one’s metaphors! To avoid any reliance upon the spacing of metaphor these 
metaphors ought not even to be metaphoric; not different metaphors, but different than 
metaphor. Differing and deferring to the brink of their own expulsion from the différantial 
order, they would struggle to be other than metaphoric in order to metaphorize their reliance 
upon the element of spacing. Sliding ever faster, these metaphors would feel themselves 
compelled to found an entirely new catachresis: a way of meaning, that is to say, that could no 
longer be understood from a quasi-metaphoric vantage. At this point, where fractious 
différance struggles to differentiate itself, is never fast enough and can no longer keep up with 
itself, we believe it prepares for a paratactical interjection.viii If, however, we intend to expose 
possibilities for meaning beyond both the semantical and the syntactical, beyond essence-
difference, it will be necessary to develop a form of analysis appropriate to the task: an 
analysis that will keep pace with différance; exponential rather than existential. Reconfiguring 
the question of essence for purposes of alignment, we here introduce, as a first step in this 
exponential analysis, the term verbality. 
 
  
Verbality 
 
We do not deploy this term to denote the use of verbs; this is not a linguistic analysis, if 
indeed there remains any point in marking a distinction. Still quasi-ontological in character, 
verbality is intended, if you will, to bring us to the ‘verbing’ of the verb.ix Verbality allows 
one to think that verbing whilst avoiding, for instance, the temporalizations particular to any 
one verb. From the previous consideration we recognize that space and time work out quasi-
metaphorically; a metaphoricity that then disallows any privilege or authorial status to be 
granted to one particular verb (the verb be, say) and opens the field to metaphors of all sorts. 
Verbs, that is to say, unfold or explicate time in and of themselves, without reliance upon an 
orchestrating master verb. Far from recognizing its supplementarity, however, philosophy has 
typically favored the verb be in its understanding of time, such that time might well seem to 
fly, drag, or drowsy, but only on the basis of time’s essential connection with being. On such 
an account temporalization, whether vulgar or primordial, is what the be does, and all other 
verbs only become operative through participation in this verb; no one would argue this point 
more earnestly than early Heidegger. Accordingly, the peculiar appreciations of time 
suggested by other verbs are only conceivable as adverbial modifications of this primordial 
verb ‘be’ that in its verbing makes all other verbs possible. 
 
With early Heidegger, moreover, the temporal character of the verb be, and thus the true 
temporal character of time, is to be discovered in this verb’s dealing with a nullity that 
remains more or less external (rather than an internal differentiation/alterity, for example). By 
contrast, that which opens the spatial dimension of the verb be, distending the nominal realm 
of the object in the present of the Gegenwart, aligns itself with the motif of Verfallen and the 
untruth of time. Thus, maintaining the priority of the verb be while expanding its explication 
across its entire verbal range on the one hand, and authentically articulating this verb in 
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purview of its negative on the other hand, it will have been predictable that Heidegger would 
be led toward a congruent and horizonal temporality (mobilized in its entire possibility 
through running-up against the ‘never’ of the nothing); the infinitive ‘to be’ is explicated to 
the limit of its tenses under the watch of the finite ‘not to be,’ and together this produces the 
orchestrative whole of Sein und Zeit. 
 
If one were simply to repeat the analysis of Being and Time (i.e. restrict ourselves to the 
explication of this one master verb) verbality would of course amount to nothing more than 
another name for Being; a synonym for the orchestrative verbing typical of this particular, but 
primordial, verb be. Following the lead others have made,x though, if primordial temporality 
is taken less ‘primordially’ (i.e. considered merely an instance of temporalisation, reflecting 
the congruence of time) and if its opposition to vulgar temporality (the fall from utterly 
congruent time to a more disjointed time) is negotiated in a less metaphysical way (which 
may arguably have been early Heidegger’s intention anyway), then one might indeed agree 
that prior to the congruent-disjointedness of time there remains a différance of time. The 
point is that although one is no longer dealing with a plenitudinous phenomena here, nor with 
a word nor a concept, one might yet address the verbality, or verb-nouning, of this new verb-
noun; namely, the characteristic orchestrative tendencies of différance. Thus, to reiterate for 
the sake of clarity, spatio-temporality (distinguished from primordial temporality) is 
structured non-horizonally and non-congruently, there remaining an excess of time between 
fug and unfug that can never be reduced to time, or resolved in time. This excess is not 
something other than time. It is only in differingly-deferring from itself that time gives rise to 
différance, as différance gives rise to time. One cannot separate them out. Non-plenitudinous 
‘in itself,’ there remains a co-dependency between différance and plenitudinous space-time 
that undermines any traditional opposition and thus any ‘in itself.’xi Supplementarity demands 
this thoroughly complex co-dependent weave of plenitude and non-plenitude that serves to 
renegotiate even this first or final opposition. Hence, the apparent structuring of spatio-
temporality as congruent incongruence is merely characteristic of this complexity, and 
reflects (as does the apparent structuring of all things) this complexity in its complexity. 
 
With the emphatically hyphenated term “spatio-temporality” denying early Heidegger the 
privilege he arguably assigns to the truth of time, the complexity of the différantial system 
declares itself characteristically in the clamor of the verb be and the silence of its offbeat. 
Clearly there can be no prior performance, or plenitudinous point of simplicity, that serves to 
structure this complexity in the manner declared. Notwithstanding, in view of this 
reconfiguration of the question of essence one already begins to notice a surprising 
conjunction of verb and noun attending these two most influential words of 20th Century 
philosophy: the verbal substantive Sein and the deverbal noun différance. Is this mere 
coincidence; an accident of history; of marginal significance?xii Verbality is not intended 
metaphysically – identifying some hidden plenitude behind plenitude, an ethereal potential of 
the verb that enlivens the body of the noun, for instance. Nonetheless, as an analytical tool it 
does possess the facility of extension beyond the phenomenal, beyond plenitudinous space-
time. For it seems important today to find a way to enquire responsibly of différance; to 
understand better the peculiar characteristics of the verb and its deverbal suffix, and of what 
(in the language of essence-difference) would properly be considered the pre-pre-originary 
interaction of the two. Obviously such an analysis does not attempt to identify what 
différance is or what it is made of. Rather, it is a case of asking ‘how goes it with différance? 
How does différance peculiarly resolve the aporia of time? Without doubt, the excess of this 
“re-” must be given due regard if our question is to be heard correctly. The re- and the -solve 
inaugurate a complexity that can never be resolved in time, for the “re-” is that which solves 
the aporia; it is the way of the aporia, the way of having no way. So it is that with this perhaps 
ungainly neologism, ‘verbality,’ we nonetheless believe one finds space to inquire of the 
characteristics of the root verb and of the role played by its deverbal, middle voiced 
suffixation; the first stage of the exponential analysis of différance. 
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How goes it with différance? How is it that, différer ‘ances,’ and in so doing orchestrates 
even plenitude and non-plenitude as their excess? Verbality figures an attempt to distil from 
the hyphenic complexity of the participial between, that which does not seemingly succumb 
to such complexity: verbality as the structure of this complexity. An analytical device 
extending beyond plenitudinous space-time to embrace even time’s excess, at first verbality 
merely reiterates the mechanisms of différance. But by examining how verbal and nominal 
effects issue in a participative explication, one is able to eventually ‘get a handle’ on 
différance; one is able to observe the characteristic spacance of the différantial system. No 
matter how middle-voiced it may be (for the middle-voice is not nothing), the ‘ance’ of 
différance is as participial as its more active and passive cousins. Indeed, given the form of 
participation proper to the middle-voice one might regard it as the participative par 
excellence. This participial “ance,” in the smooth spreadliness of its middle-voice, lends to 
the deverbal noun its element of orchestrative spacing, as the verb lends its peculiar 
complexity, impetus and paths. In the simplest terms, we ask whether différance, so busy, so 
brilliant, is yet safe in assuming this spacing, or whether – notwithstanding its undeniable 
complexity, its escape from plenitude and its middling-voice – it still ought rather to attempt 
to rewrite such spacing. 
 
Différer ‘ances.’ With this description we do not presume any apriority for the verb and the 
suffix, and say nothing more than ‘différance.’ The participative moment does not precede 
différance, in such a way as to suggest that one might uncover a more originary opposition 
that would thus set deconstruction on its way once more. Différance is not simply a noun. 
Neither can it be simply a verb, a pure becoming, which is why there is no pure différance 
either way, no “difference in itself.”xiii Nonetheless, the orchestrated spacing that exemplifies 
the order of the verb-noun testifies to, and is demanding of, the particular ‘ancing’ of 
différance’s peculiar verb. So emerges the choreography characteristic of the nonidentical 
same, a choreography with which, in the way that it goes, we express only agreement and 
respect; a thoroughly complex ‘ancing’ (a ‘différer-ancing’) structuring the question of 
essence received from the tradition in its particular way. We do not attempt to distend this 
question further, acknowledging the brilliance of its delimitation.  
 
The axiomatic realization of the participial is an inauguration, the inauguration a regional 
orchestration. Do our descriptions here attempt to account for différance? By no means. One 
cannot account for this deverbal noun: as though we might uncover an unlimited profit, an 
essence behind essence-difference, laid-up in some ontotheological vault where moth and rust 
do not corrupt. Such accounting remains within the limits of the question of essence. The 
participial is neither empirical nor transcendental but precisely that which organizes this 
difference. The question of being is neither temporal nor metaphysical but accounts for these 
parameters, and the challenge is to think the question accordingly. One cannot ‘crack-open’ 
différance to reveal another What is? behind the scenes. Situated at the very limits of the 
ontological, implacable différance will not succumb to such a mode of enquiry and if we wish 
to press this element of spacing further we cannot simply repeat our question over and over. 
If différance describes the limits of the question of essence then any question aimed at 
différance from within those limits will break harmlessly against its flanks.  
 
Accordingly, it is not my intention to account for différance but rather to spur différance to 
account. If with the notion of verbality one is able to acquire a certain analytical purchase on 
différance, therefore, it is still important to develop forms of ‘critique’ suitable to the 
continuation of the analysis. Although initially adopting a deconstructive stance, the enquiry 
must explore other ways in which to press this unaccountable element of spacing; a spacance 
that, despite everything, returns each time the same. We urge différance to engage with this 
portentous metaphoric spacing (both the spacing of metaphor and the metaphor of space), in 
an exponential self-analysis; to ask itself whether its spacing comes too soon.  If so, then the 
potency of its own issue will be at issue, threatening a suspension of the movement of the 
orchestrative ‘re-.’ For certainly this could not be any sort of plenitudinous spacing, it could 
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not be spacing as such. So presumably différance will be able to rewrite its quasi-dependency. 
Like the circling logic of addiction, however, in rewriting this spacing différance only catches 
itself again, relying on that very same element. 
 
 
Paranoia 
 
Spacing comes too soon. Différance participates too readily, too determinately, in this spacing 
as this spacing. The economies that characterize the différantial system cannot account for 
such a moment, for its necessity or its persistence. The relève does not give rise to this 
element of spacing but relies on it before ever the complex dimensionality of the ‘re-’ is 
augured. This realization, in no way a realization, a reliance before any reliance, preludes and 
institutes all balancing of profit and loss. Beyond all play of proper and improper, beyond all 
rhetorical flourishes, scare-quotes and caveats, this internal, middle-voiced spacing appears in 
some sense proper to the différantial system. Of course this ‘properly’ could never be a 
proper ‘proper.’ Or, rather, we must strive to understand this propriety beyond the play of 
proper and improper proper to quasiontology. Indeed, we must constantly maintain the 
highest regard for différance in all of our dealings, and if we oppose verb and suffix it is not 
in an attempt to illustrate what remains metaphysical in the grammatical system in which this 
deverbal noun is undeniably inscribed. To avoid the repetitive banality of such a 
demonstration, however, it will be necessary to develop a method (of sorts) suitable to the 
task. One’s analysis must slide with différance, applying itself to the between just as 
différance differentiates between; an ‘as’ more acute than any plenitudinous ‘now’; the ‘as’ of 
the hyphenic dimension of différer’s ‘ancing.’ In this way the analysis applies itself to 
différance in différance: before différance is able to issue in space and time; before the ‘ance’ 
is able to accomplish the non-plenitudinous spacance upon which the ‘re-‘ of the relève relies. 
Pursuing différance différantially, pressed up against différance’s hyphenic ‘ancing.’ 
Imposing itself on the between at that very moment when différance tries to ‘give us the slip,’ 
the analysis applies itself to différance just as différance secretes itself from plenitude. 
 
It is in this aspect that verbality does not simply reiterate but will start, by way of the 
exponential analysis, toward a paraphrastic account of différance. For, if différance is 
constrained to rewrite itself other than itself, if this element of spacing is to unfold quasi-
metaphorically, and if this very quasi-metaphoric unfolding unavoidably ascribes to this 
elemental spacing in its spacing, then mere rewriting will prove inadequate to itself. Differing 
and deferring faster and faster without ever quite coming to the issue, breathless différance 
will be constrained to an internal dimension. Through the paranoia of a compulsive re-writing 
it can never write off, différance’s self-affliction will mark the curve of an exponential textual 
slippage; a parataxis différance cannot contextualize, not even via the motif of the ‘re-’. This 
transversal curve (sinus) marking a dimension of exponential slippage in the interstices of 
différance, insinuates a parallelism. Ontologically this insinuation makes no sense at all. If 
formally one can speak of a para-noia that panics even quasi-ontological concepts, 
empirically one would refer to the startle as the delimitation of all empiricism, 
phenomenological or otherwise (Love, 2008). If, however, one is able to find a way to 
paraphrase this insinuation, then one raises the possibility of non-ontological modalities of 
meaning that remain irreducible to the hither and thither of onto-logics. 
 
Within différance one begins to witness the distension of an irresolvable direction, an 
indifference that nonetheless troubles différance, a resonant modulation that does not direct 
itself along the path of the relève. Différance sets about the task of rewriting with 
consummate tenacity; a speed and rigor unmatched by plenitudinous forms of analysis, only 
différance could be this fast. But harrying the relève, interrupting its moment of issue, the 
analysis directs the dissolute wayward trace into a nonplenitudinous interstice torn in the 
fabric of the text. Never resolving the matter, never coming to the point, différance subjects 
itself to a spur that even the future perfect fails to reach or gloss (a dimensionality it will not 
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have assumed via repetition). The exponential exposition thus slices through the 
ligamentatious traces and chases différance into a narrow, internal dimension. Along the 
coursing of this resonant trajectory there is insinuated a certain parallelism of regions. Despite 
its constantly being-on-the-go, différance cannot straddle the indifference of paranoia, and so 
a non-différantial relation emerges between différance and that which is ‘beyond the text’. 
The para-noia that afflicts différance thus points toward a potential set of conditions of 
possibility of meaning that are irreducible to essence-difference; conditions of possibility that 
avoid syntactical (and thus semantical) classification.  
 
A resonant trajectory, then, imploding along the course of exponential slippage that marks the 
disruption of the trace in its movement of tracing, the analysis takes the form of a compulsive 
re-writing of the element of spacing – a compulsion that seeks something different to writing, 
but that can only ever succeed in writing differently. This indifference denies différance the 
relief of the relève. Unable to disseminate its element of spacing, différance plays with itself, 
putting itself on hold. Constraining itself for fear of coming too quickly, an internal drama 
arrests the issue of spacing – différance being unable to make its spacing an issue. For it is 
this element that inoculates différance against the imperative and absolute “Différer!” 
Without this participial spreadliness, all would collapse into absolute presence and death. 
Like some mysterious quintessence, as ephemeral as différance, nothing apart from 
différance, this element stubbornly remains, striating its own failed rewriting. The trace 
thrown off the scent, différance thus loses its way, engrossed in an internal audit it can never 
‘sign off;’ struggling to balance an unaccountable profit, a debt it can neither renegotiate nor 
write off. With this, différance forbids itself any orchestrative return. Held back from the 
relève, just going through the motions yet for all that unable to resist the spur, fractious 
différance presses into this strange spaceless place.  
 
Différance simply cannot rewrite itself fast enough to rewrite itself. Scratching away in 
irritation, a form of textual para-noiaxiv interjects in the busy orchestrations of différance. 
There will be no time for etymology or difference here; the equivocal senses of the ‘para-’ 
can no longer be figured différantially – our context destroys context. The paranoia that 
afflicts différance is not governed by the relève. On the contrary, paranoia is the inability of 
the relève to relieve. Paranoia is utterly indifferent to our paranoia. It has no reason, no 
illumination, no end in sight: there is no aposiopesis for the paranoid. Progeny of the question 
‘Why?’, there is no ‘What?’ to appease paranoia. Collapsingly maintaining itself, maintaining 
spacing in rewriting spacing, like Oedipus fleeing fate, différance unravels in the paragraphia 
of a writing without difference. There is no deferment here, no delay: différance startled; 
thought thinking everything together and at once. Paranoia does not move us on in an orderly 
orchestration, giving one time and space for reflection. Nothing comes since nothing ‘to 
comes’; everything crowding in, jostling, preventing progression or différantiation. Tumbling 
gerundially, différance collapses toward an acuity opened in the domain of the verb-noun. 
And yet this curve insinuates other potentialities for meaning. Cutting across the threads of 
syntactical sense, paranoia alludes to a meaning that différance will never get. This allusion, 
occurring at the point at which the exponential analysis converges with its insinuation, the 
point at which the parallel meet and différance surpasses itself, suggests not only the 
delimitation of the (quasi)ontological comportment but, with its utter indifference to 
différance, promises also other modulations and other questions. 
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Notes  
                                                 
i Most acutely, perhaps, the conceit that time might give itself to writing at all. That it might bend this way or that 
before our prose; that one might have time, when in fact for so very long we have all been had by time. 
ii A difficult word, ‘logic,’ but then all words are difficult. Better yet, all words are (im)possible, there no longer 
being such things as words. A mere glimmering skin of meaning made possible by the unending reflective play of 
différance, words fail us when faced with this aposiopesis. Whilst this essay is littered with all sorts of impossible 
words (‘logic,’ ‘element,’ ‘structure’) most of all there is no such thing as the word différance, which fact would 
seem to challenge the very basis of our later analysis. Notwithstanding, while reason might not be able to 
encapsulate différance, it can nonetheless travel its traces; the traces, for instance, that connect the word différance 
to its conditions of (im)possibility. Thus although on the one hand there are no words, and while on the other hand 
every word more or less says différance, yet there is still a propriety to words, an improperly proper way to speak 
of différance, a propriety the word ‘word,’ for instance, more or less lacks. The ensuing analysis of différance is 
accordingly concerned less with the word différance than it is with the traces that slip away in constituting this 
word, and yet do so différantially. Said differently, in as much as the word différance can be considered an 
empirical supplement that completes the quasi-transcendentality of différance, one is compelled to shift the 
analysis, more or less, to the latter word différance, now rewritten. Whichever way it goes, our analysis attempts to 
keep pace, pursuing différance this way and that way and once more in between, pressing différance to surpass 
itself. 
iii If différance is indeed on its way toward a consummate modality of ontological difference, it is precisely 
because it does justice to this complexity, spreading itself impartially and equanimously ‘between’ in a way that 
difference qua contradiction and ‘difference in itself’ do not. This tendency toward utter description (description to 
the point of nihilism) characterizes both the ontological and, to a lesser degree, the epistemological trajectories of 
philosophical inquiry, but it is the  questioning comportment specific to ontology that remains our primary focus in 
relation to Derrida; not to ontologize being, after all, still to ontologize (c.f. Derrida, 1978, p. 152). 
iv Despite the proscription of the naturalistic fallacy, ontopolitics persists with the belief that essence-difference 
can somehow produce a properly aligned and ontologically founded political ethic—a description of prescription. 
The ontological question thus remains the determining question for political philosophy, and both metaethics and 
politics only seem thinkable from out of this (quasi)ontology. What we elsewhere attempt to think is a way of 
formulating an alternate question (of sorts), a non-ontological question, which for this reason could not simply be a 
different question. Levinas encourages us in this respect when he broaches, perhaps for the first time in the history 
of Western thought, a question of quisnity not thought from the basis of quiddity (Levinas, 1998, p23ff; Levinas 
1978, p. 43ff). To this point, to read Levinas seriously has been to read him ontologically; which is already to say, 
différantially. Autrement q’être notwithstanding, this is because Levinas writes ontologically, at least in the 
extended sense we now wish to ascribe to that word (a question of essence that also questions essence). This said, 
the possibility of a non-ontological reading remains. 
v We have in mind Masaccio’s Eve (Expulsion from Paradise). Beyond the (un)concealing play of her hands – 
which simple gestures establish the economies of essence-difference across ethics, politics, theology, demanding a 
reading longer than we can provide here – it is her face that sets another trajectory for enquiry. Hollowed by the 
desperation of a question that history has been unable to satisfy, surely this is a face that exceeds the play of 
essence-difference, if not for the reasons preferred by obvious others. 
vi This is not simply to note the importance of Heidegger’s ontological difference for Derrida’s development of 
différance, although obviously this fact is not merely incidental. Rather, this multivocal formulation attempts to 
capture the demands supplementarity places on différance. 
vii Essential to différance! It is hard to imagine a more properly inappropriate expression (unless perhaps it is the 
equally telling phrase ‘difference in itself,’ which also more than adequately articulates the parameters of the 
comportment ‘essence-difference’). Such ‘essentiality,’ then, could no longer be thought in opposition to 
difference, it will not be the essence of différance in this sense, all of which demands that we rigorously negotiate 
the complexity of non-identical sameness in our efforts to appreciate the orchestration of plenitude and non-
plenitude through the verb différer. In order to appear less abruptly antagonistic, however, one might favor the 
phrase ‘structurally indispensable,’ but truthfully the difference will prove inconsequential. From out of the 
negotiation will arise certain corollaries we believe to be applicable to any différantial system. 
viii A forthcoming work will explain how one might employ the notion of parataxis in an attempt to step 
axiomatically beyond the orchestrations of essence-difference Taken in a certain way, this instance of acute 
parataxis will assist in an exposition of the surpassing of metaphor in indifference and the appellation of other 
modalities of meaning. 
ix We use this term for the sake of accessibility. To be rigorous one would have to complicate this formulation a 
little, referring more precisely to the ‘verb-nouning’ of the verb-noun. For there is no pure verb. The verb – we 
argue in familiar terms – can only verb, is only able to participate, through explication and explication requires the 
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nominal in some affixation or another. Verbality as orchestration implicates both verb and noun. Nouns verb as 
space times, and even that most verbal of verbs (should such a designation now remain appropriate) was given to 
us substantively with Sein. Ontologically, that is to say, the verb already nouns, establishing the participial 
between of essence-difference. This introductory piece attempts to set course toward an appreciation of the 
explication of the noun-verb différance. The term verbality will first find a degree of precision for itself in relation 
to this suffixial explication; an explication which is simultaneously an orchestration; an explicative orchestration 
that inaugurates the irreducibly complex spacing of the différantial in the participial spreadliness characteristic of 
the ‘ance.’ In truth, if one could contrive to read the root noun of this term verbality (i.e. the noun ‘verb’) verbally, 
or, by comparison, if one were able to summon with the adjective of this de-adjectival noun a sense of the verbing 
of the verb, then the complicity of, and necessity of both, verb and noun becomes apparent enough in this more 
convenient term. Verbality, that is to say less painfully, refers to neither the verb nor the noun in a straightforward 
way, but to the deconstruction this opposition invites (and here one might compare the opposition/deconstruction 
Heidegger establishes/invites with his Existenz and Realität), but to a deconstruction that is itself once again 
orchestrated by this verbality. Why, in an already overdetermined field, do we insist on redrawing this opposition 
between Existenz and Realität in terms of verb and noun? It may well be that, notwithstanding the potential 
misunderstandings we risk, our two terms do reconfigure the Heideggerian opposition in an interesting manner, 
but why not simply proceed to a deconstruction of this opposition (in such a way as to reaffirm the irreducibly 
aporetic nature of time)? Why take the time, why take the risk? Precisely because we believe that this aporia, 
whilst no doubt avoiding the temporalisation of the excess of time, nonetheless orchestrates time, and that this 
orchestration is performed by the explication of the verb différer in the deverbal noun différance. Our 
reconfiguration of this opposition provides a way to examine the orchestration of this verb, which as supplemental 
is only every other verb in différance. Hence, the verbality of the verb. Thus, whilst initially merely repeating these 
well-known motifs, we will not rest with them. Neither verb nor noun, neither Existenz nor Realität, but more than 
this, neither either nor both – neither either nor the difference between the two – the tumbling of the gerund will 
aspire to dramatize (without orchestrating) an occurrence elsewhere. 
x See in particular Derrida’s (1982) White Mythology. 
xi That plenitudinous thing we refer to as time, just as for any plenitude, is, one might say, “the trace of the erasure 
of the trace” of différance (Derrida, 1982:66). As we know, these traces cannot bear the weight of metaphysics, 
they do not refer to any presence, and yet they do bear the weight of reason, more or less. Thought travels these 
hyphenic traces that link essence and différance in différance. 
xii There is perhaps no longer any such thing as the purely accidental, at least not for essence-difference, where 
every path has already been broken before ever it is traversed. 
xiii Here of course we gesture again toward the Deleuzean formulation, a pure becoming that nonetheless requires 
nodes of being, a deterritorialisation that can seemingly only live with itself in reterritorialisation. A forthcoming 
work deals more respectfully and sensitively with the specific modality of difference proper to both Nietzsche and 
Deleuze, but concludes nonetheless that ontologically speaking differance is definitive. Political ontologies such as 
these result in metaphysics, precisely owing to their prescriptive tendency disguised as a descriptive function.   
xiv Resembling thought but not quite a thought, a thought too fast for ontology, as a philosophical practice, to 
apprehend. Somehow alongside or parallel to received ontological thought. An abnormal or defective 
philosophical ontology, a para-dox, opposed to thought or beyond (para) thought; opposed to thought beyond any 
opposition to thought. Perhaps even a preparation (parare) for thought. A preparation and defence (parare) against 
ontology’s tendency to run up against predetermined axiomatic limits. 
